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MATTER OF A-B-: A DECISION THAT ABSOLVES THE
UNITED STATES OF ITS ROLE IN CREATING AND
PROMOTING VIOLENCE IN EL SALVADOR
Yenis Vanesa Argueta Guevara*
I. INTRODUCTION
In June 2018, then-Attorney General Jefferson Sessions (hereinafter
“AG”) released Matter of A-B-, a precedential opinion that has a substantial
effect on asylum cases of people fleeing harm from non-state actors,
particularly victims of domestic and gang violence.1 The AG employed an
infrequently used “refer-and-review” provision of the Immigration and
Nationality Act (hereinafter “INA”) that allowed him to certify immigration
cases from the highest administrative tribunal to himself for review.2 After
doing so with A-B-, the AG reversed the Immigration Board of Appeals’
(hereinafter “Board” or “BIA”) decision and replaced it with his own, which
is binding on the BIA and immigration courts.3 The opinion narrows the
path available for victims fleeing domestic and gang violence to seek asylum
in the United States by placing a high level of doubt on whether they can
meet the statutory requirements.4 A-B- focuses on “private violence” and to
what extent people fleeing this type of cruelty, particularly domestic and
gang violence, can take refuge in the United States.5
*
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1
Matter of A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 316, 337 (A.G. 2018).
2
See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(h)(1)(i).
3
See 8 U.S.C. § 1103(g)(2) (2018) (“The attorney general shall . . . review such
administrative determinations in immigration proceedings.”); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(1)(i)
(“The Board shall be governed . . . by decisions of the Attorney General (through review of a
decision of the Board, by written order, or by determination and ruling pursuant to section
103 of the Act).”).
4
See Matter of A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec at 332–40.
5
Id. at 317 (“Specifically, I sought briefing on whether, and under what circumstances,
being a victim of private criminal activity constitutes a cognizable ‘particular social group’
for purposes of an application for asylum or withholding of removal.”).
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The AG engages in this legal analysis without recognizing the United
States’ influence in forming and sponsoring this type of violence in El
Salvador. Viewed out of that context, the AG is quick to state that victims
of private violence are generally unable to satisfy the statutory
requirements.6
This Comment posits that the United States has a long, extensive
history of interfering with and promoting violence in El Salvador. Viewed
through this lens, Matter of A-B- must be seen as another decision that fails
to account for the United States’ role in El Salvador’s violent past and
present. The second section of this Comment will navigate through the
United States’ extensive intervention during El Salvador’s Civil War as well
as its response to Salvadoran asylum-seekers at that time. The third section
will delve into U.S. foreign policies in El Salvador after the Civil War. The
fourth section will analyze Matter of A-B-. In that section, this Comment
will also compare A-B- and the nature of the opinion with asylum policies
towards Salvadorans during the Civil War. The last section will propose
several solutions the United States can adopt to address the crisis it has
created.
II. UNITED STATES FOREIGN AND ASYLUM POLICIES TOWARD EL
SALVADOR DURING THE SALVADORAN CIVIL WAR
This Section will focus on the United States’ intervention during the
Civil War. Before exploring that time, it is important to understand the leadup to the Civil War, which, unsurprisingly, also involved much participation
from the United States.
A. Why did the Salvadoran Civil War Happen?
The divisions and inequalities regarding human rights and living
standards in El Salvador began with the Spanish conquest, which placed all
the land in El Salvador with people of European descent and gave next to
nothing to mestizos or indigenous people.7 The land-owning class continued
its power through military dictatorships.8 Maximiliano Hernández Martínez
became the leader of El Salvador through a coup d’état in 1931.9 Hernández
Martínez’s reign proved bloody immediately after it was established: he
quashed and instilled fear in the Salvadoran people during the massacre

6

Id. at 320.
See History of El Salvador, TEACHING CENTL. AM., https://www.teachingcentral
america.org/history-of-el-salvador (last visited Apr. 20, 2019).
8
See id.
9
Stewart W. Fisher, Human Rights in El Salvador and U.S. Foreign Policy, 4 HUM.
RTS. Q. 1, 4 (1982).
7
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known as La Matanza.10 In 1932, El Salvador’s government refused to seat
elected communists in government.11 The government’s refusal inspired a
peasant uprising, led by Agustín Farabundo Martí, which prompted a swift
and brutal response from Hernández Martínez’s regime that killed tens of
thousands, mostly indigenous Nahuat, of people over the course of several
weeks.12 The animosity between the military dictators and the peasant class
of the Salvadoran government did not subside after La Matanza in 1932.
Approximately 30,000 Salvadorans were killed.13 Although the United
States initially opposed his regime because of the 1923 Washington
Treaties,14 the United States later recognized his government in 1934, about
two years after La Matanza.15 Since the military takeover of Maximiliano
Hernández Martínez, the “military continued to exercise almost
uninterrupted control in Salvadoran politics,” and the United States
continued to provide military and economic aid from the 1940s through the
Military Assistance Program and then increased the military training through
the Public Safety Program.16
The military government of El Salvador maintained its power from
December 1931 through the Civil War beginning in 1980 using sheer force
and political dishonesty,17 and the presence of the United States “was not
only inattentive to the need for social reform . . . but also was a major
obstacle to such reform.”18 In the 1960’s, the United States began fearing
Communist uprising in the Americas, so, beginning with President Kennedy,
it encouraged Latin American countries to pass reforms to maintain the peace
but, like the presidential administrations before it, maintained a direct line of
military supply to El Salvador.19 It was important for the United States to
maintain a stronghold over the Salvadoran government in case there were
Communist uprisings or any other threats to the region that could negatively

10

See id. at 5.
See id.
12
RM DeLugan, Commemorating from the Margins of the Nation: El Salvador 1932,
Indigeneity, and Transnational Belonging, 86 ANTHROPOLOGICAL Q. 965, 966 (2013).
13
Carl W. Levander, En El Nombre De Dios–The Sanctuary Movement: Development
and Potential for First Amendment Protection, 89 W. VA. L. REV. 191, 193 (1986).
14
Kenneth J. Grieb, The United States and the Rise of General Maximiliano Hernandez
Martinez, 3 J. LATIN AM. STUD. 151, 151 (1971), http://www.jstor.org/stable/156558 (explain
-ing that the treaty was signed by several Central American countries agreeing to not
recognize leaders or regimes that were brought into existence through violence or a coup
d’état in the region and that the United States would base its recognition of the governments
on this principle).
15
See id. at 169–70.
16
Levander, supra note 13, at 193.
17
Fisher, supra note 9, at 4.
18
Fisher, supra note 9, at 26 (citation omitted).
19
Fisher, supra note 9, at 26.
11
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impact United States’ interests. During the Nixon and Ford administrations,
the United States’ encouragement of social reform was largely wishful
thinking. Henry Kissinger, who was mostly in charge of foreign policy
during the Nixon and Ford administrations, consistently found no evidence
of human rights violations in El Salvador.20 The United States ambassador
to El Salvador during the Ford administration, Ignacio Lozano, stated “he
had received little to no help in implementing human rights initiatives.”21
Throughout his presidency, President Carter attempted to place human rights
at the forefront of the United States’ policy in El Salvador, but,
simultaneously, his administration fought to stop social reform before El
Salvador became another socialist country in Latin America. The United
States began to implement policies and laws that could force El Salvador to
tackle its human rights abuses in the country.22 El Salvador quickly rejected
military aid from the United States, following an example set by several
other countries that would be impacted by these laws.23 The United States,
however, did not yield.24 Shortly thereafter, the repressive government of El
Salvador began to take steps to reduce the human rights violations occurring
in the country, but those measures only lasted until the United States
approved a bank loan.25 In the last year of Carter’s administration, the United
States abandoned its façade that human rights were at the forefront of its
foreign policy in El Salvador and, in the process, turned its back on a country
that was on the brink of a brutal Civil War. Carter’s administration showed
that the United States valued stopping the threat of communism over human
rights.26
Domestically, El Salvador was a ticking time bomb. Throughout the
mid-twentieth century, left-wing guerrillas and the military-controlled
government continued carrying out death squads to intimidate the other
side.27 As the clashes between the two groups intensified, violence was
increasingly aimed at civilians.28 Salvadoran rebels launched a final
20

Id.
Fisher, supra note 9, at 27.
22
Two sections of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961: section 502B, which would
prohibit military aid to governments that consistently indulge in patterns of gross violations
of international human rights, and section 116, which would prohibit economic aid to
governments guilty of repeated human rights violations; and several 1977 amendments to the
International Financial Act forcing US lending institutions to vote against loans provided to
repressive governments.
23
Fisher, supra note 9, at 28.
24
Id.
25
Fisher, supra note 9, at 28–29.
26
Fisher, supra note 9, at 33.
27
El Salvador, CTR. FOR JUST. & ACCOUNTABILITY, https://cja.org/where-we-work/elsalvador/ (last visited Nov. 3, 2018).
28
Levander, supra note 13, at 194.
21
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offensive to topple the US-supported forces days before Reagan’s
administration.29 The Carter administration began delivering deadly aid to
El Salvador in early 1981 to combat the guerrilla’s final offensive.30
B. Foreign Policy During the Salvadoran Civil War (1979–
1992)
Reagan viewed the insurgency and uprising in El Salvador as “the place
to draw the line in the sand against communism.”31 During his presidency,
the United States held firm that El Salvador should stand as a barrier to
communist expansion in Latin America32 since it viewed the insurgency in
El Salvador as part of a larger global network to expand communism.33 The
United States, and President Reagan directly, believed the country’s
problems could be solved only through military intervention, completely
disregarding the basis and background of the rebellion. Under Reagan, the
United States supplied massive amounts of money to the Salvadoran
government to terminate the communist threat in the Americas. Of the total
military aid received by El Salvador from the United States during the 1980s,
roughly sixty percent was financed through the president’s discretionary
funds, not through congressionally-approved aid.34 Roughly six billion
dollars in aid went “to defeat a popular-backed insurgency and establish a
moderate democracy” in Latin America during the war.35 The United States
armed and trained Salvadoran soldiers, some on United States soil.36
Both the Salvadoran and United States governments, throughout the
war, claimed that most of the human rights abuses were being perpetrated by
the guerrillas, but, although guerrillas were heavily perpetrators of violence
towards government officials and their families, the rebels did not kill with
impunity like the Salvadoran government.37 Evidence existed that military
Brian D’Haeseleer, ‘Drawing the line’ in El Salvador: Washington Confronts
Insurgency in El Salvador, 1979–92, 18 COLD WAR HIST. 131, 131 (2018).
30
Levander, supra note 13, at 193.
31
Raymond Bonner, America’s Role in El Salvador’s Deterioration, THE ATLANTIC
(Jan. 20, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/01/trump-and-elsalvador/550955/.
32
D’Haeseleer, supra note 29, at 143.
33
Norma Roumie, Gangs and the Culture of Violence in El Salvador (What role did the
US play?), 5 THE GREAT LAKES J. OF UNDERGRADUATE HIST. 24, 30 (2017).
34
Cara E. McKinney, Twelve Years a Terror: U.S. Impact in the 12-Year Civil War in
El Salvador, 2 INT’L RESEARCHSCAPE J. Art. 5 (2015).
35
D’Haeseleer, supra note 29, at 131. Some estimates put the total amount at $4.5
billion. See id.
36
Roumie, supra note 33, at 30; McKinney, supra note 34.
37
Christine Caldera, The State of El Salvador: Human Rights and Violence in the Post
War Era (2015) (unpublished A.B. thesis, University of Dayton) (on file with the University
of Dayton e-Commons multimedia archives). (The Salvadoran government utilized “death
squads to carry out grave human rights abuses . . . against innocent individuals for denouncing
29

ARGUETA (DO NOT DELETE)

266

10/3/2019 7:21 PM

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 50:261

aid was ending up in the hands of corrupt members of the Salvadoran
military, who participated in terror tactics, yet the United States did not stop
military funding.38 The United Nations Truth Commission Report confirmed
“at least 85% of human rights atrocities committed during the war are
attributable to the Salvadoran military and its security forces.”39 From 1980
to 1992, over 70,000 people died in the Civil War,40 over 500,000 sought
asylum in other countries, and tens of thousands were wounded or
disappeared.41
1. The Executive’s Response to Salvadoran Refugees and
Asylum Seekers During the War
Not only were we supporting these human rights abusers in El
Salvador, then we were in a way perpetuating a further terror on
that same population in the United States by depriving them of
their rights under the law—and trying to send them back to the
very human rights violators that the United States government was
supporting. And so that whole systematic violation of the law and
of human rights was just so profoundly offensive.42
i. The Carter and Reagan Administrations’ Hard-Pressed Line
Against Salvadorans Seeking Asylum
President Carter signed the Refugee Act of 1980 (hereinafter “Refugee
Act”) on March 17, 1980.43 The Refugee Act adopted the definition of a
“refugee” from the 1967 Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of
Refugees:
any person who is outside any country of such person’s nationality
or, in the case of a person having no nationality, is outside any
country in which such person last habitually resided, and who is
unable or unwilling to return to, and is unable or unwilling to avail
himself or herself of the protection of, that country because of
persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of
race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social
the government or suspicion of aligning with the left. Members of death squads in El Salvador
were members of the military . . . In retaliation, [guerrillas] perpetuated violence against the
government and army in order to protect innocent rural community members.”).
38
Roumie, supra note 33, at 30.
39
D’Haeseleer, supra note 29, at 140 (quoting Comm. on the Truth for El Salvador,
From Madness to Hope: the 12-year war in El Salvador, Report of the Commission on the
Truth for El Salvador, U.N. Doc. S/25500 (1993)).
40
McKinney, supra note 34.
41
Joaquín M. Chávez, An Anatomy of Violence in El Salvador, NACLA (Sept. 25, 2007),
https://nacla.org/article/anatomy-violence-el-salvador.
42
SUSAN BIBLER COUTIN, NATIONS OF EMIGRANTS: SHIFTING BOUNDARIES OF
CITIZENSHIP IN EL SALVADOR AND THE UNITED STATES 51 (2007).
43
Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (1980).
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group, or political opinion.44
The Refugee Act requires an individualized, case-by-case analysis of
all asylum claims, which differs from pre-Act United States immigration
law. Before 1980, federal law was mostly concerned with protecting those
individuals fleeing communist governments.45 In the Refugee Relief Act of
1953, Congress specified that “refugees must come from communist or
communist-dominated countries.”46 The United States viewed refugee
policy as a means to adopt foreign policy.47 After signing the 1967 Protocol,
however, the United States was faced with the fact that the Protocol’s
definition of “refugee” differed from its domestic definition.48 In 1978,
Congress endeavored for United States law to be in accordance with the 1967
Protocol, resulting in the Refugee Act.49 The Refugee Act was also enacted
to end the anti-communist bias in adjudicating asylum claims.50 The
Refugee Act eliminates nationality, alone, as a qualification for refugee
status.51 President Carter hailed the Act as “a new admissions policy that
will permit fair and equitable treatment of refugees in the United States,
regardless of their country of origin.”52 The Refugee Act was signed and
implemented as the violence in El Salvador rapidly increased.
One of the biggest challenges Central Americans faced while seeking
asylum in the 1980s was the requirement to establish that the violence they
had experienced in their home land constituted persecution.53 The Reagan
Administration argued Salvadorans were “economic migrants”—people
leaving El Salvador for personal gain, not political safe-haven.54 These
economic migrants, it was argued, were “beyond the legal bounds for federal

44

Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42).
Kenneth D. Brill, The Endless Debate: Refugees Law and Policy and the 1980 Refugee
Act, 32 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 117, 122 (1983) (“Refugee policy was an ideological weapon in the
Communist-Free World competition.”).
46
Id.; Refugee Relief Act of 1953, Pub. L. No. 83-203 § 2(a)-(c), 67 Stat. 174 (expired
1956).
47
Brill, supra note 45, at 123.
48
Brill, supra note 45, at 124.
49
Id.
50
Deborah Anker, U.S. Immigration and Asylum Policy: A Brief Historical Perspective,
13 IN DEF. OF THE ALIEN 74, 74 (1990).
51
Stephen Macekura, “For Fear of Persecution”: Displaced Salvadorans and U.S.
Refugee Policy in the 1980s, 23 J. POL’Y HIST. 357, 358 (2011). The Refugee Act still
provides that someone can base an asylum claim on persecution on account of nationality.
The difference is that a person must now show there is persecution or a well-founded fear of
persecution because of that nationality.
52
Statement on Signing S. 643 Into Law, 1 PUB. PAPERS 503 (Mar. 18, 1980).
53
Susan Bibler Coutin, Falling Outside: Excavating the History of Central American
Asylum Seekers, 36 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 569, 574 (2011).
54
Macekura, supra note 51, at 358.
45
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protection”55 because they did not have a viable fear of persecution in their
native country. Economic migrants were ineligible for special treatment
under United States immigration law.56 This classification as “economic
immigrants” stemmed from the fact that the Reagan Administration
supported the Salvadoran government.57 As discussed earlier, the Reagan
Administration maintained its stance that the rebels, not the government of
El Salvador, were responsible for human rights violations—a position that
would be undermined if the United States accepted refugees and asylum
seekers.58 The legal consequences of the Refugee Act allowed foreign policy
concerns to dictate an exclusionary refugee policy.59
The Refugee Act’s goal to end anti-communist bias fell short, which is
particularly seen in its adjudication of asylum claims from Central America.
About “90 percent of the refugee admissions from abroad have been from
communist or communist-dominated countries” and “Central Americans . . .
[were] ineligible to apply for refugee status outside the United States.”60
Additionally, between July 1983 and September 1989, the approval rate for
asylum applications for people from El Salvador was about two percent.61
The approval rates for people from the U.S.S.R., Romania, and Iran were
72.6 percent, 70.3 percent, and 61.5 percent, respectively.62
Another way to receive asylum was through Extended Voluntary
Departure (hereinafter “EVD”),63 which President Carter first denied in
1980. Instead, the Carter Administration deported 12,000 Salvadorans back
to El Salvador in 1980 alone.64 In 1981, Senator Kennedy implored the State
Department to consider the violence in El Salvador when adjudicating
Salvadoran’s asylum claims, including a “blanket voluntary departure,”65
which had been offered to Ethiopians from May 1977 to November 1981;
Iranians from April 1979 to November 1980; and Nicaraguans from June
55

Macekura, supra note 51, at 365.
William Deane Stanley, Economic Migrants or Refugees from Violence? A TimeSeries Analysis of Salvadoran Migration to the United States, 22 LATIN AM. RES. REV. 132,
132 (1987).
57
Coutin, supra note 53, at 576.
58
See supra Part II.B.
59
Macekura, supra note 51, at 358.
60
Anker, supra note 50, at 80.
61
Anker, supra note 50, at 81.
62
Anker, supra note 50, at 80–81.
63
EVD, now known as Deferred Enforced Departure, refers to an administrative grant
allowing individuals from certain countries to stay temporarily in the United States until the
conditions in their home country change. United States Citizenship and Immigration Services
(USCIS), Adjudicators Field Manual § 38.2, https://www.uscis.gov/ilink/docView/AFM/
HTML/AFM/0-0-0-1/0-0-0-16606/0-0-0-16764.html (last visited Feb. 12, 2019).
64
Macekura, supra note 51, at 361.
65
Brill, supra note 45, at 128.
56
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1979 to September 1980.66 The State Department denied the request,
claiming that the violence in El Salvador had not yet reached the levels of
violence of other countries and Salvadorans in the United States were not
solely seeking haven in the United States.67 It is striking that during the time
EVD was denied, the Reagan Administration sought “congressional
approval for military assistance to the government of El Salvador by showing
a fair record on human rights.”68 President Reagan consistently refused to
extend EVD protection to Salvadorans.69 By 1984, 1.2 million Salvadorans,
about 25 percent of the Salvadoran population, were displaced from their
home: 480,000 within the country; 244,000 in Mexico or other countries in
Central America; and 500,000 in the United States.70
ii. The Sanctuary Movement
When the Salvadoran Civil War began, many religious groups and
human rights organizations mobilized to provide aid to displaced
Salvadorans.71 In the mid-1980s, congregations were openly defying the
government by “publicly sponsoring and supporting undocumented
Salvadoran and Guatemalan refugee families.”72 Participants in the
movement transported Central Americans “over the border and across the
country” and aided by providing legal representation, food, medical care, and
employment.73 The US government responded by prosecuting eighteen
activists resulting in mixed verdicts, a conviction, and an acquittal.74
In 1985, several religious and refugee service organizations and two
undocumented immigrants sued various government officials, including
then-Attorney General Richard Thornburgh. The suit “challenged systemic
discrimination against Salvadoran and Guatemalan asylum-seekers” by the
United States government.75 Specifically, the plaintiffs argued that
Salvadorans and Guatemalans were wholly denied asylum.76 About two to
three percent of asylum cases regarding Salvadoran nationals succeeded
66

Brill, supra note 45, at 128–29 n.60.
Brill, supra note 45, at 129–30.
68
Brill, supra note 45, at 130.
69
Macekura, supra note 51, at 371–72.
70
Coutin, supra note 53, at 575–76.
71
Macekura supra, note 51, at 369.
72
Susan Gzesh, Central Americans and Asylum Policy in the Reagan Era, MIGRATION
POL’Y INST. (Apr. 1, 2006), https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/central-americans-andasylum-policy-reagan-era.
73
Id.
74
Id.
75
Carolyn Patty Blum, The Settlement of American Baptist Churches v. Thornburgh:
Landmark Victory for Central American Asylym-Seekers, 3 INT’L J. REFUGEE L. 347, 347
(1991).
76
Id.
67
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during the eighties.77 Comparatively, the asylum grant for all nationalities
was about twenty-four percent.78 In 1989, the case was certified as a classaction that included Salvadorans and Guatemalans that were denied asylum,
withholding of removal, and EVD.79 Eventually, the case settled.80
Importantly, the settlement agreement acknowledged that foreign policy and
nationality are irrelevant in determining “whether an applicant for asylum
has a well-founded fear of persecution.”81 Counter to Reagan’s entire
refugee policy, the settlement also stated that it is irrelevant to an individual’s
asylum claim whether the United States government has “favorable
relations” with the asylum-seeker’s home country.82 Provided certain
requirements were met, the settlement provided a de novo asylum
adjudication for all Salvadorans and Guatemalans that were previously
denied asylum or those that did not file for asylum.83
2. Congress Responds to the Refugee Crisis in Late 1980s
and Early 1990s
Beginning with the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act
(hereinafter “IRCA”), many of the reforms regarding Salvadoran asylumseekers were handled through several Congressional acts. Since the focus of
this Comment is refugee policy toward Salvadorans, these acts will be
evaluated briefly in this section insofar as the acts pertain to Salvadoran
asylum-seekers.
i. 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act
IRCA legalized undocumented immigrants that entered the United
States before 1982 as long as they (1) proved continuous residence in the
United States; (2) paid a fine and back taxes; (3) proved they were not guilty
of any crimes; and (4) had some knowledge of the United States history and
government and the English language.84 IRCA also imposed sanctions
against employers that hired immigrants without work authorizations.85 Due
to the employment requirements after IRCA was passed, asylum applications
77

Id. at 349; See Anker, supra note 50, at 81.
Blum, supra 75, at 350 n.18.
79
Blum, supra 75, at 352.
80
United States Citizenship and Immigration Services, American Baptist Churches v.
Thornburgh (ABC) Settlement Agreement, USCIS, https://www.uscis.gov/laws/legalsettlement-notices/american-baptist-churches-v-thornburgh-abc-settlement-agreement.
81
Am. Baptist Churches v. Thornburgh, 760 F. Supp. 796, 799 (N.D. Cal. 1991).
82
Id.
83
Id.
84
Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603 § 245A(a)(2)–(4),
100 Stat. 3359, 3394–95 (1986).
85
Id. § 274A(a) at 3360.
78
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quadrupled to over 100,000.86 Since the Salvadoran economy depended on
remittances from nationals in the United States, immigrants facing
unemployment and possible deportation alarmed President José Napoleón
Duarte, the Salvadoran president from 1984 to 1989. President Duarte urged
“President Reagan to give temporary refuge to Salvadorans living illegally
in [the] country.”87 In a striking turn of events, the United States’ foreign
policy in El Salvador now benefitted Salvadorans living in the United States.
President Reagan voiced support for displaced Salvadorans following
President Duarte’s stance against deportations.88
ii. The 1990 Immigration Act and Temporary Protected Status
Congress passed the 1990 Immigration Act (hereinafter “1990 Act”)
“to respond to humanitarian crises throughout the world.”89 The 1990 Act
created Temporary Protected Status (hereinafter “TPS”), which allows
certain noncitizens from designated countries to remain in the United States
legally with work authorization.90 The 1990 Act designated Salvadorans as
beneficiaries of TPS.91 As the name states, TPS designation was
temporary—protection lasted eighteen months, beginning on January 1,
1991.92 After the eighteen-month period ended, President George H. W.
Bush granted those Salvadoran beneficiaries with Deferred Enforced
Departure (DED), “another form of non-statutory blanket relief from
deportation.”93 DED expired on December 31, 1994, but Salvadorans’ work
authorization continued as beneficiaries were given the option to apply for
asylum.94
TPS was significant in that it “codifie[d], for the first time, criteria and
procedures for granting entire classes” of noncitizens relief from deportation
until conditions in their country of origin stabilize.95 TPS also stands in
contrast to the United States’ asylum policies: TPS was granted to
Salvadorans because of their nationality. Asylum protection is granted only
to individuals, on a case-by-case evaluation, that meet the statutory
86

Coutin, supra note 53, at 580.
Robert Pear, Duarte Appeals to Reagan to Let Salvadorans Stay, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 26,
1987), https://www.nytimes.com/1987/04/26/world/durate-appeals-to-reagan-to-let-salvador
ans-stay.html.
88
Macekura, supra note 51, at 374.
89
Bill Frelick & Barbara Kohnen, Filling the Gap: Temporary Protected Status, 8 J.
REFUGEE STUD. 339, 339 (1995).
90
Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, § 244A, 104 Stat. 4978, 5030 (1990).
91
Id. § 303(a)(1) at 5036.
92
Id. § 303(a)(2) at 5036.
93
Frelick & Kohnen, supra note 89, at 342.
94
Frelick & Kohnen, supra note 89, at 342.
95
Peter C. Diamond, Temporary Protected Status Under the Immigration Act of 1990,
14 IMMIGR. & NAT’LITY L. REV. 205, 206 (1992).
87
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requirements in the Refugee Act.
III. UNITED STATES FOREIGN AND ASYLUM POLICIES TOWARD EL
SALVADOR AFTER THE SALVADORAN CIVIL WAR
The Salvadoran government and guerrillas entered negotiations to end
the Civil War in early 1990.96 On January 16, 1992, the two parties signed
a peace accord, the Chapultepec Peace Agreement, in Mexico City.97 The
Civil War was officially over.
Gangs have been one of the biggest sources of violence in El
Salvador.98 These gangs—and the violence they inevitably create—is what
drives most Salvadorans to flee their homes.99
A. Gangs
Mara Salvatrucha (hereinafter “MS-13”) and Calle 18 (hereinafter
“18th Street”) are the two most prominent gangs in El Salvador today.100
These two gangs are associations of networks that, largely, control parts of
El Salvador and have a vast web of criminal activities.101
These two gangs were formed in Los Angeles, California: 18th Street
in the 1960s and MS-13 in the 1980s.102 As Salvadorans migrated to the
96
Margarita S. Studemeister, El Salvador: Implementation of the Peace Accords, U.S.
INST. OF PEACE (2001).
97
United Nations, General Assembly, The Situation in Central America: Threats to
International Peace and Security and Peace Initiatives, A/46/864 (Jan. 30, 1992) , https://pea
ceaccords.nd.edu/sites/default/files/accords/Chapultepec_Peace_Agreement_16_January_19
92.pdf; Diana Villiers Negroponte, Remembering El Salvador’s Peace Accord: Why Was That
Peace Elusive?, BROOKINGS INST. (Jan. 19, 2012), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/up-front/
2012/01/19/remembering-el-salvadors-peace-accord-why-was-that-peace-elusive/.
98
Life Under Gang Rule in El Salvador, INT’L CRISIS GROUP (Nov. 26, 2018),
https://www.crisisgroup.org/latin-america-caribbean/central-america/el-salvador/life-undergang-rule-el-salvador (“The culprit [for the murder rate of 103 per 100,000 inhabitants in
2017] in most of these murders is the maras (gangs).”) [hereinafter Gang Rule]; Anastasia
Moloney, Factbook: Six Reasons Why El Salvador Became One of the World’s Murder
Capitals, REUTERS (May 11, 2016, 12:16 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-elsalvador-violence/factbox-six-reasons-why-el-salvador-became-one-of-the-worlds-murdercapitals-idUSKCN0Y221K (“Gang violence has plagued El Salvador for decades, making the
Central American country of 6.4 million people, one of the most dangerous outside a war
zone.”).
99
Anna-Catherine Brigida & Heather Giesin, ‘Our country is not a safe place’: why
Salvadorans will still head for the US, THE GUARDIAN (June 4, 2018, 12:59 AM),
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/jun/24/salvadorans-deported-from-us-facingviolence-fleeing-poverty.
100
Gang Rule, supra note 98.
101
See id.
102
Dara Lind, MS-13, explained, VOX (Feb. 5, 2019, 9:45 AM), https://www.vox.com/
policy-and-politics/2018/2/26/16955936/ms-13-trump-immigrants-crime; Don Winslow,
MS-13 Was Born in the USA, DAILY BEAST (Feb. 2, 2019), https://www.thedailybeast.com/ms
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United States beginning in the mid-twentieth century and during the Civil
War, immigrants were met with xenophobic rhetoric and labeled as “selfinterested economic migrants.”103 Life in the United States was not easy for
both documented and undocumented Salvadoran immigrants because the
group faced “symbolic and structural violence” stemming from the “fear of
deportation; the exploitation of their work and rights; [ ] and their exclusion
from socioeconomic resources” that could have provided opportunities of
upward mobility and incorporation into American society.104 Salvadoran
immigrants were “accountable” in the eyes of the law, but were not protected
by it.105 They worked low-paying jobs and held deep feelings of isolation
from mainstream society.106 For many there was uncertainty as to their legal
status107 and whether their stay in the United States would end in deportation.
These conditions laid the foundation for the formation of the gangs, a direct
response to the United States’ failure to address the needs of the Salvadoran
immigrants living on its lands. Gangs originated to fill the void left by the
lack of an identity, as well as to fit in, in a new and unknown country.
The government’s response to gangs in the United States was swift. In
Los Angeles, gangs were seen as part of the force that fueled the decay of
urban life and laws were enacted to deport migrants that formed the gangs.108
Since there was no genuine definition of what gang membership was, law
enforcement was given substantial discretion, which led to the
criminalization of innocent and non-gang-affiliated individuals.109 The
increase in deportations and general criminalization further destabilized El
Salvador. Many people who were deported in the 1990s faced difficulty
reintegrating in El Salvador because the country was devastated by a terrible
Civil War and many did not have family left in El Salvador.110 The country,
dealing with a weak infrastructure and a feeble institutional framework,
-13-was-born-in-the-usa; Barrio 18, INSIGHT CRIME, https://www.insightcrime.org/elsalvador-organized-crime-news/barrio-18-profile-2/ (last updated Feb. 13, 2018).
103
Roumie, supra note 33, at 33.
104
Id.
105
Roumie, supra note 33, at 33–34.
106
Roumie, supra note 33, at 34. See generally Manuel Vasquez, Saving Souls
Transnationally: Pentecostalism and Gangs in El Salvador and the United States,
CHRISTIANITY, SOC. CHANGE, & GLOBALIZATION IN THE AMS. 1 (2003). Many Salvadorans
were unable to receive state or federal welfare benefits because of their status.
107
Mary Kathleen Dingeman-Cerda, ¿Bienvenidos a Casa? Deportation and the Making
of Home in the U.S.-El Salvador Transnation (2014) (Ph.D. dissertation, University of
California, Irvine). 1980 Refugee Act removed nationality as a criterion to grant asylum and
since the United States supported the government in El Salvador, it continuously rejected
claims by refugees escaping the war and those seeking political asylum. Roumie, supra note
33, at 32.
108
Roumie, supra note 33, at 36.
109
Roumie, supra note 33, at 36–37.
110
Roumie, supra note 33, at 37–38.
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could not offer support for deportees.111 Furthermore, deportees were
deemed threats to Salvadoran national security, which increased
stigmatization and oppression of deportees.112 Gangs did not build their
identity in El Salvador around their cultural background; instead, gangs built
their identity around the opposition of rival gangs.113 The United States
effectively exported what it saw as a problem to a weakened country.
El Salvador entered its own war on drugs (Mano Dura and Super Mano
Dura), largely adopting tactics from the United States, which further
worsened gang culture in El Salvador.114 Zero tolerance policies in El
Salvador had the opposite effect of their purported purpose: they fostered
institutionalized gangs instead of combating them, continued to marginalize
youth, created distrust in the government, and increased the inmate
population in prisons.115 The use of violence to defeat gangs actually
supported their efforts to recruit other youth; gangs occupied the safe-space
that the government could not by consoling youth that felt demonized and
persecuted by the state.116 In fact, criminal organizations spread quickly in
response to unsuccessful “U.S. anti-crime policies in the 1980s that were
later adopted in Central America.”117 The United States’ involvement in
combatting gangs in El Salvador was not passive, but instead encompassed
“a large degree [of involvement] prompted by police building efforts
sponsored by US organizations as well as through interrelated activities of
American embassies.”118
More recently, a CNN report accused the United States of “quietly
fund[ing] and equip[ing] elite paramilitary police officers in El Salvador”
accused of extrajudicial killings of alleged gang members.119 The police unit
Special Reaction Forces (FES) killed 43 suspected gang members. 120 This

111

Roumie, supra note 33, at 38.
Id.
113
Roumie, supra note 33, at 40.
114
Danielle Mackey & Cora Currier, El Salvador Is Trying to Stop Gang Violence. But
the Trump Administration Keeps Pushing Failed “Iron Fist” Policing, THE INTERCEPT (Oct.
2, 2018), https://theintercept.com/2018/10/02/el-salvador-gang-violence-prevention/ (“As the
gangs grew in size and power, successive Salvadoran governments reacted with mano dura,
doing so with the full backing of the United States.”).
115
Roumie, supra note 33, at 41–42.
116
Id.
117
Jose Miguel Cruz, Central American Gangs Like MS-13 Were Born Out of Failed
Anti-Crime Policies, THE CONVERSATION (May 8, 2017), https://theconversation.com/centralamerican-gangs-like-ms-13-were-born-out-of-failed-anti-crime-policies-76554.
118
Roumie, supra note 33, at 43.
119
Nick Paton Walsh et al., US-Funded Police Linked to Illegal Executions in El
Salvador, CNN, https://www.cnn.com/interactive/2018/05/world/el-salvador-police-intl/
(last visited Feb. 8, 2019).
120
Id.
112
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unit received significant funding from the United States.121 Although FES
has been disbanded, many of its officers joined a new unit that continues to
receive funding from the United States.122 Similar to the United States’ past
actions regarding Salvadoran gang members, the United States funded
money to FES officers—who were shooting people dead in the streets of El
Salvador—and deported thousands of MS-13 recruits.123 The report
categorized this level of violence as a “culture of lawlessness in El
Salvador,” in which police officers actively engage in conversations to
discuss how to hide extrajudicial killings.124 The United States claims it
takes “allegations of extrajudicial killings extremely seriously,”125 and units
receiving United States aid must show there is a fundamental respect for
human rights.126 These extrajudicial killings have prompted comparisons to
the Civil War in El Salvador when government soldiers killed civilians with
impunity.127 A woman whose son was murdered by the police claims life
now is “like during the [civil] war, they’re killing young people but talking
about it can get you killed as well.”128 The United States’ commitment to
human rights and vetting of units falls short, a common trend in its affairs
with El Salvador. The Salvadoran police is receiving attention for its
treatment of gang members, but one should not overlook the United States’
role.
B. Trade Deals and Other Salvadoran Policies
The United States’ interference leading to El Salvador’s destabilization
also includes influence in trade deals. Although this Comment focuses on
domestic and gang violence, economic destabilization is important to
understand the extent to which the United States continues to weaken El
Salvador.
After the Salvadoran Civil War, the United States “endorsed a
neoliberal economic reconstructionist plan in El Salvador,” which led to
“increased foreign investment, privatization of public infrastructure[,] and

121

Id.
Id.
123
Id.
124
Id. In one of these instances, an officer disparages other officers for beating someone
before killing him. In his opinion, this would undermine their story that the gang member
was killed in a shootout.
125
Paton Walsh, supra note 119 (quoting a spokesperson for the United States embassy).
126
Id.
127
Nina Lakhani, ‘We Fear Soldiers More Than Gangsters’: El Salvador’s ‘Iron Fist’
Policy Turns Deadly, THE GUARDIAN (Feb. 6, 2017, 6:00 AM), https://www.theguardian.com
/world/2017/feb/06/el-salvador-gangs-police-violence-distrito-italia.
128
Id. (alteration in original).
122
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lack of investment in public programs.”129 This neoliberal policy failed to
consider the issues that led to the Civil War in the first place and instead
adopted methods that would benefit the United States.
The Dominican Republic-Central America Free Trade Agreement
(hereinafter “CAFTA-DR”) is a trade agreement between the United States
and several Central American countries130 and the Dominican Republic.131
The CAFTA-DR “promotes stronger trade and investment ties, prosperity,
and stability throughout”132 Central America and the Dominican Republic as
well as along the southern border of the United States. Before El Salvador
entered the agreement, many Salvadorans protested the deal, claiming it was
an “unfair, anti-democratic agreement that will only serve the interests of
U.S.-based multinational corporations.”133 CAFTA-DR ensures Central
American countries and the Dominican Republic are dependent on the
United States because of “massive trade imbalances and the influx of
American agricultural and industrial goods that weaken domestic
industries.”134 The tariff reduction model in CAFTA-DR creates impossible
conditions for domestically grown/produced products to compete with
imports. Critics of free-trade deals, including CAFTA-DR, claim these type
of agreements undermine democracy in Latin America and that the United
States continues its control over these countries “through commercial
exploitation and political coercion.”135 CAFTA-DR was hailed as a way to
curb violence and poverty in Central America.136 Since it was enacted in
2004, it has done close to nothing to deter violence and decrease poverty, but
it does allow employers to exploit workers and avoid providing fair working

129

Roumie, supra note 33, at 30.
These countries include Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and
Nicaragua.
131
Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, CAFTA-DR (Dominican Republic-Central
America FTA), https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/cafta-dr-dominicanrepublic-central-america-fta (last accessed Nov. 3, 2018).
132
Id.
133
Committee in Solidarity with the People of El Salvador (CISPES), Major
Mobilizations in El Salvador to Protest CAFTA and Honor Schafik Handal, (Feb. 1, 2006),
http://cispes.org/blog/major-mobilizations-in-el-salvador-to-protest-cafta-and-honorschafik-handal?language=es).
134
Mark Tseng-Putterman, A Century of U.S. Intervention Created the Immigration
Crisis, MEDIUM (June 20, 2018), https://medium.com/s/story/timeline-us-interventioncentral-america-a9bea9ebc148.
135
Michelle Chen, How US ‘Free Trade’ Policies Created the Central American
Migration Crisis, THE NATION (Feb. 6, 2015), https://www.thenation.com/article/how-usfree-trade-policies-created-central-american-migration-crisis/.
136
Héctor Perla Jr., The Impact of CAFTA: Drugs, Gangs, and Immigration, TELESUR
(Mar. 1, 2016), https://www.telesurtv.net/english/opinion/The-Impact-of-CAFTA-DrugsGangs-and-Immigration-20160301-0008.html.
130
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practices.137
IV. MATTER OF A-B-: REVERTING TO THE 1980S UNITED STATES
REFUGEE POLICY TOWARDS SALVADORANS
The Refugee Act defines a refugee as a person who is “unable or
unwilling to return to” her home country “because of persecution or a wellfounded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality,
membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.”138 An
applicant seeking asylum must meet all the requirements in the statute to be
eligible for asylum. The INA does not define “membership in a particular
social group.”139 The BIA first defined a particular social group (hereinafter
“PSG”) in Matter of Acosta as “a group of persons all of whom share a
common, immutable characteristic.”140 Such characteristic must be one that
the individuals in the group cannot change or should not have to change
because it would violate their fundamental identities or consciences.141 The
BIA gave several examples of traits that constitute immutable
characteristics, including “sex, color, kinship ties, . . . former military
leadership or land ownership.”142
In Matter of M-E-V-G- and Matter of W-G-R-, the Board defined two
additional elements, three in total, to establish membership in a PSG: (1) the
group is composed of members that share a common, immutable
characteristic; (2) the group must be defined with particularity; and (3) the
group must be socially distinct from the society the refugee is trying to
escape.143 In determining whether a PSG meets those requirements, the
applicants must submit “evidence that the proposed group exists in the
society in question.”144 This evidence can include “country conditions
reports, expert witness testimony, press accounts of discriminatory laws and
policies, historical animosities,” and other evidence that may show the group
is distinct.145
The BIA thereafter decided Matter of A-R-C-G-. Ms. ARCG was a
woman fleeing domestic violence in Guatemala.146 Her husband repeatedly

137

Id.
8 U.S.C.S. § 1101(A)(42)(A) (2018).
139
Matter of A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 316, 318 (A.G. 2018).
140
Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 233 (B.I.A. 1985).
141
Id.
142
Id.
143
Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227, 237 (B.I.A. 2014); Matter of W-G-R-, 26
I. & N. Dec. 208 (B.I.A. 2014).
144
M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 244.
145
Id.
146
Matter of A-R-C-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 388, 389 (B.I.A. 2014).
138

ARGUETA (DO NOT DELETE)

278

10/3/2019 7:21 PM

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 50:261

beat her.147 Ms. ARCG sought help from the police multiple times, but they
told her they would not interfere in her marriage or domestic disputes.148 Ms.
ARCG fled Guatemala to escape her abuser.149 In her asylum claim, Ms.
ARCG sought to establish that she was persecuted on account of her
membership to the PSG “composed of ‘married women in Guatemala who
are unable to leave their relationship.’”150 The Immigration Judge found that
Ms. ARCG did not meet the requirements for asylum on the basis that she
did not prove “she had suffered past persecution or [had] a well-founded fear
of future persecution” due to her membership in the PSG “married women
in Guatemala who are unable to leave their relationship.”151 After an
immigration judge denied her asylum, Ms. ARCG successfully appealed to
the BIA.152 The BIA made clear that PSG’s must be considered in light of
the evidence and context presented regarding those circumstances in the
case.153 It recognized that the immutable characteristic of Ms. ARCG was
her gender and that marital status can also be an immutable characteristic if
the asylum-seeker could not leave the relationship.154
A. Matter of A-B-: Case Law Analysis
Matter of A-B- is a decision in response to A-R-C-G. As in A-R-C-G-,
the respondent in A-B- fled her country to escape her partner, who abused
her for years.
1. Factual Background
Ms. AB fled El Salvador after enduring approximately fifteen years of
“relentless physical, sexual, and emotional abuse” at the hands of her
husband.155 Ms. AB was beaten repeatedly, even while she was pregnant.156
The extent of Ms. AB’s abuse included her partner bashing her head against
the wall and/or kicking her.157 Her husband frequently raped her.158 Ms.
AB’s partner would sometimes hold a knife to her neck or threaten “to hang

147

Id.
Id.
149
Id.
150
Id. at 389.
151
Id.
152
A-R-C-G-, 26 I. & N. at 388–89.
153
Id. at 392.
154
Id. at 392–93.
155
Respondent’s Opening Brief at 3, In The Matter of: [Redacted], Matter of A-B-, 27 I.
& N. Dec. 316, 321 (A.G. 2018) [hereinafter AB Brief], https://uchastings.app.box.com/s/
tt1ydliq5ttm1i2zxlz4rname4bk29s7/file/291241595459.
156
She has three children with her husband. AB Brief, supra note 155, at 2–3.
157
AB Brief, supra note 155, at 3.
158
Id.
148
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her from the ceiling by a rope.”159 Her husband constantly insulted, isolated,
and humiliated her.160 Her children were not shielded from her husband’s
abuse, as he would “also beat their children in front of her.”161
The Salvadoran government did close to nothing to protect Ms. AB.
She was granted two restraining orders, but the police did not enforce
them.162 Although the police arrested Ms. AB’s husband for threatening her
with a gun, he was released a few days later.163 After she was threatened
with a knife, the police explicitly told Ms. AB they could not help her, but
encouraged her to “get out of here.”164
2. Procedural Background
Ms. AB arrived in the United States and requested asylum on the
grounds that she suffered persecution on account of her membership in a
particular social group: “El Salvadoran women who are unable to leave their
domestic relationships where they [the two partners] have children in
common.”165 The immigration judge166 denied asylum to Ms. AB because
he concluded she (1) was not credible; (2) did not belong to a qualifying
particular social group; (3) did not establish that membership to that
particular social group, if the group were acceptable under the INA, was
central in her persecution; and (4) did not “show that the Salvadoran
government was unable or unwilling to help her.”167 On appeal, the BIA
overruled the immigration judge’s decision, relying on Matter of A-R-C-G,
and ordered the immigration judge grant Ms. AB asylum.168 The BIA found
Ms. AB (1) credible; (2) was member of a particular social group
substantially similar to Matter of A-R-C-G- (“married women in Guatemala
who are unable to leave their relationship”); (3) could not leave her husband;
and (4) the Salvadoran government was unable and unwilling to protect
her.169 Following Ms. AB’s completion of background checks, as the BIA
directed in order to proceed with the asylum claim, Judge Couch “refused to

159

Id.
Id.
161
Id.
162
AB Brief, supra note 155, at 4.
163
Id.
164
Id.
165
Matter of A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 316, 326 (A.G. 2018).
166
Immigration Judge V. Stuart Couch has a “long history . . . of denying asylum to
domestic violence survivors.” Backgrounder and Briefing on Matter of A-B-, CTR. FOR
GENDER & REFUGEE STUD., https://cgrs.uchastings.edu/matter-b/backgrounder-and-briefingmatter-b (last updated August 2018).
167
A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 321.
168
Id.
169
Id.
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issue a new decision in the case.”170 The AG then certified the case to
himself for disposition.171 The issue was “whether, and under what
circumstances, being a victim of private criminal activity constitutes a
cognizable ‘particular social group’ for purposes of an application for
asylum or withholding of removal.”172
3. The Attorney General’s Decision
The decision in A-B- formally overrules A-R-C-G-. As described
above, A-R-C-G- held that, “[d]epending on the facts and evidence of an
individual case, ‘married women in Guatemala who are unable to leave their
relationship’ can constitute a cognizable particular social group.”173 The
case gave women fleeing domestic violence greater hope in receiving asylum
based on the abuse suffered in their home. Ms. ARCG’s case had many
similar elements to Ms. AB’s case: her husband beat and raped her, her
husband repeatedly threatened to kill her, and the police refused to help or
intervene in Ms. AB’s marriage.174 In the decision, the AG affirms asylumseekers hoping to establish persecution because of a membership to a PSG
must show (1) membership to a group, in which members share an
immutable characteristic, the group is defined with particularity, and the
group is socially distinct from society; (2) membership to the group is central
to the asylum-seeker’s persecution; and (3) if the perpetrator is not affiliated
to the government, the home government is unable or unwilling to protect
the asylum-seeker.175 In overruling A-R-C-G-, the AG criticized the Board
for incorrectly applying its own precedents and “because it recognized an
expansive new category of particular social groups based on private
violence.”176 Furthermore, A-B- stated that for a PSG to be cognizable, it
“must ‘exist independently’ of the harm asserted in an application for
asylum.”177 In contrast, the AG believed, A-R-C-G- recognized a group that
was defined circularly by its harm.178
Most of the AG’s damaging remarks were dicta. He made broad
generalizations of claims by domestic violence victims and those that were
victims of private action in stating they would normally not qualify for

170

Backgrounder & Briefing on Matter of A-B-, supra note 166.
A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 323.
172
Id.
173
Matter of A-R-C-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 388 (B.I.A. 2014).
174
Id. at 389.
175
A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 320.
176
Id. at 319.
177
Id. at 334 (emphasis in original) (quoting Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227,
236 n.11 (B.I.A. 2014)).
178
Id. at 334–35.
171
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asylum.179 He further claimed that there may be “exceptional circumstances”
when victims of private actions could meet the requirements to be granted
asylum.180 Additionally, the AG was unclear about the role the government
had to play to establish it failed to protect the asylum seeker. He made
remarks that the asylum-seeker must establish the perpetrator’s actions “can
be attributed to the government,”181 which has not been a standard applicable
in the past or even in the Refugee Act itself: government must be “unable or
unwilling” to provide protection to the asylum seeker.182 The AG stated: the
government’s protection must be “so lacking” that the harm itself may be
attributed to the government.183 The American Immigration Lawyers
Association has categorized this decision as a clear statement by the AG to
close asylum claims on domestic violence victims as well as people fleeing
gang violence.184 One thing is clear: this decision creates another burden for
people fleeing violence and seeking to take refuge in the United States.
B. Coming Full Circle: Matter of A-B- as Another Attempt to
Wholly Deny Asylum to Salvadorans
Salvadorans fleeing violence during the Civil War had the burden of
overcoming the label of “economic migrants.”185 Their motives were
questioned and the violence they fled was almost an afterthought in
adjudicating asylum claims. A-B- has a similar rationale except the reason
for exclusion is that the alleged persecution is not perpetrated by the right
actors. Although the AG’s arguments are largely dicta, his words are
carefully selected to ensure that victims fleeing domestic and gang violence,
which are two of the central reasons people flee El Salvador, have significant
roadblocks in obtaining asylum. The result is the same as it was in the 1980s:
these specific people, because of the violence they flee, are not eligible for
asylum. The AG’s generalizations and overbroad statements deny asylumseekers the right to individualized claim adjudication, which were staples of
the Reagan administration’s adjudication of asylum claims.
The United States turned a blind eye to victims of atrocious violence
during the Salvadoran Civil War. The United States not only minimized its
own effects but also rationalized it by creating the idea that asylum-seekers
were economic migrants. Today, the United States remains a significant
179

Id. at 320.
Id. at 317.
181
A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 317.
182
Id.
183
Id.
184
American Immigration Lawyers Association, Practice Alert: AG Sessions Issues
Matter of A-B-, Overruling Matter of A-R-C-G- (July 10, 2018), https://www.aila.org/infonet/
call-feedback-impact-matter-of-a-b—decision.
185
See supra Part II.B.1.
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factor in the conditions that have led Salvadorans to flee their homeland,
including creating and exporting gangs and engaging in trade deals that
greatly disfavor El Salvador.186 In adjudicating asylum claims, adjudicators
need to consider the conditions of the asylum-seeker’s native country. A-Boverlooks the systemic and rampant violence that women experience in El
Salvador. By framing the issue as one of private action and actors, the AG
discards the role the United States had in creating a society of violence in El
Salvador. As described above, the United States has been complicit or
actively engaged in the violent present and past of El Salvador. A-B- isolated
the issue of domestic violence as one of private action and failed to account
for a society that accepts violence due to the United States influence. As one
commentator has put it, “[i]f I were one of these [domestic violence] victims
or if I had to face the Salvadoran system and society, I would have most
likely left the country.”187 The AG also dismissed Ms. AB’s claims that the
government would not help her overcome the violence she faced in the hands
of her husband. Police officers in El Salvador are ambivalent to violence
even though they are tasked with protecting people.188 As explained above,
many officers are even accused of extrajudicial killings.189
V. ACTING ON THE CURRENT REFUGEE CRISIS: HOW THE UNITED
STATES SHOULD RESPOND
People in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras (the three countries
are usually called the “Northern Triangle”) are leaving their homelands in
droves due to the unprecedented level of crime and violence in the Northern
Triangle, “raising parallels with the exodus of Guatemalans and Salvadorans
fleeing the civil wars of their respective countries during the 1980s.”190 The
United States can use several avenues to take responsibility for its role in
causing this wave of violence, which began before the Salvadoran Civil War
and continues to this day. This Comment highlights two different
possibilities: (1) a formal apology and (2) overruling Matter of A-B- and
recognizing gender and gang-related asylum claims.
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See supra Part III.C.
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See Azam Ahmed, “They Will Have to Answer to Us”, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 29, 2017),
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A. A Formal Apology
National apologies represent a great deal: apologies accept the blame
for a certain wrong and recognize the suffering of its victims. 191 One
poignant example of a formal apology comes from President Reagan. The
Civil Liberties Act of 1988 recognized that “a grave injustice was done to
both citizens and permanent residents of Japanese ancestry by the
evacuation, relocation, and internment of civilians during World War II.” 192
This Act also “[apologized] on behalf of the people of the United States for
the evacuation, relocation, and internment of such citizens and permanent
resident aliens.”193 Before President Reagan signed the Act, he said, “We
gather here today to right a grave wrong . . . for here, we admit a wrong;
here, we reaffirm our commitment as a nation to equal justice under the
law.”194
The first step in apologizing is accepting there is a reason to apologize.
Importantly, an apology condemns past behavior. The United States played
a significant role in destabilizing El Salvador during much of the twentieth
and twenty-first centuries.195 An apology would formally condemn this
behavior. Secondly, an apology commits to better actions in the future. In
this case, the United States would commit to engage in better relations with
El Salvador and its people, specifically those Salvadorans that have been
directly affected by its policies. This includes persons fleeing generalized
and institutionalized violence because that is exactly the violence the United
States created. Instead of waiting years, decades, or even centuries to
apologize for this wrong, the United States should do so now because it is at
this point in time that United States’ interference is drastically affecting
Salvadoran nationals.196
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Edwin Battistella, When Nations Apologise, AEON (Mar. 27, 2017), https://aeon.co/
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Id. § 4201(2).
194
Richard Hansen, Recalling President Ronald Reagan’s Remarks on Signing the Civil
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See supra Part II.
196
Cf. Congress Apologizes for Slavery, Jim Crow, NPR (July 30, 2008), https://www.npr
.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=93059465 (discussing how the United States House
of Representatives formally apologized for slavery a century and a half after it was abolished).
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B. Overruling Matter of A-B- and Recognizing Gender and
Gang-Related Asylum Claims
Matter of A-B- contains damaging dicta that places the success of
domestic and gang violence related claims in a high-level of doubt.197 A-Bshould be formally overruled. First, asylum law should recognize that the
primary motives for domestic and gang violence are not personal disputes.
The underlying reason of domestic violence in El Salvador is gender and
subordination.198 The underlying reason of gang-based violence in El
Salvador is a system allowing gangs to act as the de facto government.199
Countless country conditions reports show the Salvadoran government is
unable or unwilling to protect persons persecuted on account of their gender
or lack of gang affiliation.200 Perpetrators of violence toward women in
domestic relationships or those that refuse to join gangs are doing it because
of their identities and opinions.
In the broadest terms, A-B states that those fleeing domestic and gang
violence are unlikely to meet the statutory requirements because private
actors are the persecutors. This is flawed reasoning because it views
domestic and gang-based violence in a vacuum. Domestic violence flows
from a national belief that women are lesser than, and therefore subject to
the whims of, men. In fact, gender-based violence in El Salvador is so
common that it is tolerated and considered normal.201 During the Salvadoran
Civil War, government forces engaged in extreme sexual brutality, including
mass rapes.202 This trend continues today as women in El Salvador are
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murdered and subject to other types of brutality at alarming rates.203 Women
are not being attacked because of a private dispute between them and their
persecutors, instead they are being persecuted because they are women, used
as political pawns between warring gangs, and seen as a class of individuals
to be dominated by men. By the very nature of their persecution, gender
alone should satisfy the requirements of a cognizable particular social group.
On the other hand, gang-based violence, specifically the resistance of
young Salvadoran men to join these criminal organizations or those that have
renounced their membership, should serve as basis for asylum. The basic
premise for this proposal is that these groups inherently meet the “particular
social group” requirements, but gangs are also the de facto government in
most, if not all, of El Salvador.
These two groups meet the common, immutable characteristic
requirement204 because its members are joined by nationality, often age, and
past experiences,205 namely resistance to and denouncement of gangs. The
two proposed groups also meet the particularity requirement because its
boundaries are defined to include only those that explicitly and with
evidentiary proof have resisted gangs or denounced their membership. The
simple fact that there may be a large population that falls into this group
should not be a factor in determining whether it is in fact particular. Lastly,
the social distinction requirement is met because El Salvador is highly
premised on rumors and word-of-mouth, where individuals that resist gang
violence are known and continuously punished in public. As much as many
would not like for this to be true, gang members form a part of Salvadoran
society and are aware of individuals that resist their recruiting or general
efforts. Therefore, gangs perceive these young men as a group to terrorize
because of their innate characteristics.
As mentioned earlier, gangs are the rulers of the streets and lives of
individuals living in their territories. Gangs are active in 94% of El
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Rebecca Dennis, El Salvador: One of the Most Dangerous Places in the Western
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204
Although this Comment will not explore the extent of academic support, common and
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groups.
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Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 233 (B.I.A. 1985) (identifying past experiences
as an example of an immutable characteristic); See Ngengwe v. Mukasey, 543 F.3d 1029,
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Salvador’s 262 municipalities.206 In these municipalities, “gangs are . . . a
standing danger to public safety [and the] de facto authority that exerts
tremendous control over residents’ daily lives.”207 Gangs strictly limit the
freedom of intra-country movement.208 They do not permit individuals
living in another gang’s areas to enter their territory.209 The outskirts of a
gang’s territory contains check points, and those seeking entry must present
“government-issued identification cards (containing their addresses) to
determine their residence.”210 Living in a rival gang’s territory can have
drastic consequences at these checkpoints because Salvadorans risk “being
killed, beaten, or not allowed to enter the territory.”211
In sum, domestic and gang-violence should not be characterized as
private disputes between two individuals but instead need to be seen in the
background of El Salvador’s current state of politics.
VI. CONCLUSION
Statistics show that El Salvador is one of the most violent countries in
the world—the most violent country not currently at war.212 Regardless of
this horrific label, asylum policies have not adequately responded to this
humanitarian crisis. A-B- is one more brick in the wall of exclusion that is
attempting to keep out these individuals. More importantly, the country
creating this wall has contributed significantly to the circumstances causing
people in El Salvador to flee their homes. In torts, law students are taught
that if someone, call him A, puts another, call her B, in a perilous situation,
A has an affirmative duty to come to help B.213 This affirmative duty is a
legal obligation because of the nature of the harm: B would not be in that
situation but for A’s act. Salvadoran asylum-seekers should not pay the price
for the dangerous consequences of the United States’ continuous
intervention and promotion of violence. Although El Salvador’s violence
has many roots, the United States’ role cannot be denied or undermined. For
the reasons set out in this Comment, the United States must act to protect
these individuals because the United States is inextricably linked to reason
206
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208
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209
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210
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Salvadoran s are fleeing. And just as in torts, the United States should have
an affirmative duty to help those, in whatever means necessary, it has put in
a perilous situation. For Salvadorans, refugee and asylum policies are the
place to start.

